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Ridding PES SyStEmS of thE “Pay to PollutE” 
PRinciPlE: PES oPtimization StRatEgiES
By Kelly Carlson
With a stronger call to action on political and interna-tional relation fronts, the time to take meaningful action and to implement any necessary reform per-
taining to climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies 
is now.1 In fact, upcoming annual climate change negotiations 
led by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) make for the most sensible platform to re-
evaluate climate change proposals and contemplate areas need-
ing reform.2
At the center of these climate change negotiations and 
the UNFCCC work are country commitments.3 Country com-
mitments are either hard or soft—meaning that they are either 
hard number commitments to reduce pollutant emissions by a 
certain amount or that they are commitments to implement vari-
ous programs and strategies designed to reduce emissions in the 
aggregate.4 Countries making hard commitments in furtherance 
of the often cited two-degree goal are skeptical of those coun-
tries only willing to address climate change in the form of soft 
commitment pledges.5 The skepticism might be warranted, espe-
cially for programs such as Payment for Environmental Services 
(PES), which have a questionable impact on climate change 
mitigation goals.6 PES as a mitigation scheme and its ability to 
effectively address climate change as currently leveraged, is the 
focus of this Article.
The traditional PES program operates as follows: a farmer or 
landowner agrees to manage their land, either taking or abating 
specific action, to provide an ecological service (e.g. biodiversity 
conservation, carbon sequestration, or ecotourism promotion); 
payments to the farmers and landowners operate as incentives, 
making this system, in its traditional form, most similar to other 
market-based strategies.7 Variations of this general scheme have 
developed, especially to cover other natural resources in need of 
conservation, namely watersheds.8 No matter the form a PES 
program may take, one constant remains— all PES schemes 
propagate the oft criticized “pay to pollute” concept.9 Countries 
implementing PES and other “pay to pollute” projects in less 
developed countries are negating emissions reductions realized 
by the countries receiving the financial support because they 
continue to pollute on their own home fronts, failing to create 
any positive change in the aggregate.10
PES, having been implemented in various forms for decades, 
has proven effective in certain ways: helping landowners realize 
economic benefits in conserving the land rather than harvesting 
it, stimulating local economies and effectively redistributing 
wealth, and enabling the achievement of conservation goals, at 
least locally.11 Despite these positives, current PES programs 
come up short on meeting true conservation goals devoid of 
deceptive payor and service provider practices.12 Vast improve-
ment is necessary if society and climate change negotiators 
are to start viewing climate change strategies under a renewed 
lens—one that scoffs at promoting the “pay to pollute” concept 
in all its forms.
This Article argues that there are ways to achieve a more 
pure PES scheme, accurately reflecting conservationist goals, 
and devoid of the bad taste some of these soft commitment strat-
egies leave in the mouths of fellow climate change negotiators.13 
Five strategies for dissociating the “pay to pollute” concept cur-
rently intertwined with PES programs, and for realizing greater 
conservation gains include:
1  Decouple the payments from market value–This 
objective aims to recover the PES goals of steward-
ship and accountability. Traditionally, payments for 
environmental services, such as conservation of forest 
hectares are determined by assessing the value of tim-
ber on the open marketplace.14 To posit that forests only 
have inherent value as timber, a mere commodity is to 
detract from the very reason PES was introduced as a 
conservation method. Ideologically, true conservation-
ism and pollution mitigation are in direct contention 
with market and economic based incentives. Instead 
of lost opportunity in the marketplace,15 conservation 
payments should reflect the opportunity cost of keeping 
the environment and ecological systems intact should 
harvesting of the land’s resources occur. Though not 
a currently contemplated payment scheme, it draws 
parallels to restoration cost accounting conducted after 
hazardous substance and oil spills in United States.16
2  Rid of the voluntary off-sets payment scheme–
Paying PES providers for the carbon offsets created 
and for revenues generated from the sale of carbon 
credits provides them with a renewed license to pollute 
and negates any positive change realized from PES 
programs.17 For example, the Australian Afforestation 
Pty. Ltd. entails creating a timber plantation and carbon 
sinks for carbon credits so that Toyota can turn around 
and continue emitting carbon dioxide in its manufactur-
ing process, operations, and the product it produces.18
3  Target developed countries - This objective refocuses 
efforts away from traditional PES targets—undevel-
oped countries19 toward more sound prospects—devel-
oped countries with stronger socioeconomic posture. 
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These countries are better positioned to realize the 
environmental benefits of PES, without giving way 
to the volatility that PES projects might instigate.20 
Developed countries are more likely to have reliable 
governance structures and reporting mechanisms in 
place to ensure the ancillary problems associated with 
PES are kept at bay, including leakage, slippage, and 
sham agreements.21 Developed countries are also more 
likely to attribute greater value to conservation,22 rather 
than placing products in the marketplace, so they will 
not be tempted to engage in corruptive PES practices.
4  Target community property regimes–This objec-
tive contemplates that land held communally may be 
more suitable for PES projects for a number of rea-
sons. When land is held communally, there are more 
accountable parties to the contract, more watchful 
eyes, and are innately better designed for governance 
purposes because reporting of progress is centralized.23 
Ownership rights of lands held communally are less 
confusing and create less opportunity for individualized 
ulterior motives when compared to individually owned 
property, which can be “owned” in a variety of ways 
(i.e. access, use, exclusion, and management rights).24 
Collective management may be the answer to a more 
productive and self-governing PES provider profile.
5  Focus on financial integrity–This objective recognizes 
that not all funding sources are created equal due to 
lack of governance, control, and transparency. These 
shortcomings can be found in both private investment 
scenarios and investment banking undertakings. There 
is less governance and visibility overall when private 
investors are simply paying for ad-hoc projects to abate 
the effects of their pollution activity.25 Without a central 
reporting mechanism, these agreements are merely 
contracts between private parties with uncontrolled 
externalities.26 Investment banking PES implementa-
tions tend to institute more safeguards, but governance 
is still left to the banks’ discretion in most cases. The 
European Investment Bank (EIB) is an example of gov-
ernance headed in the right direction.27 It has reporting 
and enforcement safeguards in place to ensure its project 
funds are being used effectively and as intended.28 It also 
practices holistic project evaluation before backing fund-
ing by ensuring unintended consequences that might 
actually harm the objective of the project are evaluated.29
Implementing all five objectives in one fell swoop may 
prove difficult. However, some countries have already figured 
out how to implement the meat of these strategies using nation-
ally based PES systems. Though not perfect, nationally based 
systems remain leaders in effective conservation strategies. 
Mexico, for example, launched its national program, Program 
for Payments of Environmental Services (PSAB), in 2003, which 
is centrally funded, leverages strong institutional arrangements, 
and makes use of the communal property regime.30 Payments 
are made annually only after progress and compliance are veri-
fied through site visits and remote sensing.31 Monitoring proce-
dures are implemented by the National Forestry Commission 
(CONAFOR), which delegates PSAB enforcement responsi-
bilities to a sub-committee.32 Because the sub-committee is 
comprised of stakeholders covering all facets of PES projects,33 
transparency is easily accomplished.
As a result, Mexico boasts more forested areas today; in 
2010, as compared to 2000, Mexico is now deforesting less than 
155 hectares per year as compared to 354 hectares annually.34 
As deforestation continues to fall steadily in Mexico, PSAB 
has increased the value of forests to the community through 
enhanced carbon stocks.35
Overall, PES systems today are flawed and present opportu-
nities for improvement using the five strategies described and the 
Mexican system as a framework for successful implementation. 
National PES systems are more effective and true to conserva-
tion efforts because they are better positioned to implement the 
five optimization strategies.36 Changing the way countries think 
about soft commitments in climate change negotiations will 
prove important for upcoming UNFCCC conferences where a 
greater sense of social and environmental responsibility is likely 
expected from both developing and developed countries.37 So 
long as true conservationism is placed on the forefront of climate 
change agendas, the once pervasive “pay to pollute” sentiment 
should fall to the wayside. 
EndnotEs: Ridding PEs systEms of thE “Pay to PollutE” PRinciPlE: PEs  
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1  See generally Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation, Global Green-
house Warming, http://www.global-greenhouse-warming.com/climate-mitiga-
tion-and-adaptation.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (defining climate change 
mitigation versus adaptation components to climate change agreements);. 
see Climate Change and President Obama’s Action Plan, The White House, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/climate-change (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (describ-
ing the components and objectives of the Clean Power Plan—a plan setting a 
carbon dioxide emissions reduction target to 32% below 2005 levels by 2030, 
creating first-ever standards for existing power plants); Mark Landler, U.S. and 
China Reach Climate Accord After Months of Talks, n.y. timEs  
(Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/asia/china-us-xi-
obama-apec.html?_r=0 (reporting on the coined “landmark” reciprocal agree-
ment between the United States and China to curb carbon emissions by 2025 
and 2030, respectively).
2  The UNFCCC is a conglomerate of signee countries to an international 
treaty focused on mitigating, adapting to, and abating the impacts of climate 
change detrimentally impacting ecology and the environment. The focus of 
continued on page 40
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